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As part of efforts to attract, retain and expand FDI, several countries have created 
different grievance-redress mechanisms. One of these consists of an “investment 
ombudsperson,” which plays the role of a facilitator between foreign investors and the 
relevant public agencies to deal with their concerns. In this way, it is possible in a single 
government body to address investors’ issues regarding laws and administrative 
procedures and to handle post-investment difficulties involving government agencies in 
specifics areas such as labor, taxation, environment, finance, and infrastructure. 
 
The Republic of Korea’s model is a worldwide reference point for grievance redress 
mechanisms. The Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman (OFIO), a grievance-
resolution center and an advocacy body for foreign investors established in 1998, has 
played a crucial role in improving the country’s business environment for foreign 
investors. After different iterations since its establishment, the OFIO now has a unique 
connection with the aftercare services that the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion 
Agency (KOTRA) offers to investors, working in a complementary way.1 To be effective, 
investment ombudspersons must have high-level government empowerment, the support 
of the bodies involved and good governance to request detailed information from the 
administrative agencies and public entities deemed relevant and crucial to the resolution 
of foreign investor grievances.  
 
Countries wishing to pursue Korea’s success do not necessarily need to replicate the 
Korean model, but they must ensure that the solutions for regulatory or administrative 
improvements presented by ombudspersons can be discussed and possibly adopted by a 
policy-making lead agency and/or the appropriate bodies within their areas of 
competence, ensuring impartiality and legitimacy. 
 
In Brazil, the National Congress did not ratify the bilateral investment treaties signed 
during the 1990s, due to many concerns about this approach, mainly regarding the 
investor-state dispute-settlement (ISDS) provisions that are now under review in the 
2 
UNCITRAL.2 Thus, it was necessary to elaborate a new approach toward international 
investment agreements: the Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement (CFIA), 
approved in 2013 by the Foreign Trade Board (CAMEX), the Brazilian foreign trade and 
investment policy-making lead agency.  
 
The foundations or pillars of CFIAs go beyond protection provisions. They focus on 
cooperation and investment facilitation to increase confidence and investment flows, such 
as improving institutional governance, establishing mechanisms for mitigating risks and 
preventing disputes, and developing thematic agendas for investment cooperation and 
facilitation. 
 
As one of the mechanisms for improving institutional governance, strengthening the 
investment climate and preventing disputes, CFIAs introduced the investment 
ombudsperson concept, inspired by the Korean model. The Brazilian Direct Investment 
Ombudsman (DIO) was established within CAMEX, making the necessary adaptations 
for Brazil, a federative country.3  
 
Unlike OFIO’s structure,4 Brazil needed to develop its structure to meet the inherent 
needs of a federative country. Accordingly, the DIO coordinates a Focal Point Network 
comprised of main agencies and entities of the public administration at the national and 
subnational levels (including the investment promotion agencies) that work together to 
deal with investors’ concerns. Thus, the DIO can handle complaints related to the federal 
government and to Brazil’s different states, respecting their regulatory competencies. 
 
Given that investments are made at the subnational level, ombudspersons must indeed 
coordinate closely with the relevant agencies and entities of subnational governments, to 
obtain information and their engagement to support investors. At the same time, 
maintaining the confidentiality of requests, inquiries and information received from 
investors needs to be guaranteed. To improve the Direct Investment Ombudsman 
institution, CAMEX is cooperating with the World Bank through a technical-assistance 
project grounded in analytical work, stakeholders’ consultations and international 
experience.5 
 
Over time, investment ombudspersons may identify systemic grievances reported by 
foreign investors related to legislation or administrative procedures that should be 
addressed. A specific lead agency should then be empowered to address the 
ombudspersons’ recommendations. In the Republic of Korea, the investment 
ombudsperson is also chairperson of the Regulatory Reform Committee, responsible for 
improving regulations. Brazil has no regulatory reform committee. But the Direct 
Investment Ombudsman institution is represented in the National Investment Committee, 
which is the policy-making lead agency within CAMEX, and where it can suggest 
investment regulatory reforms to improve the investment climate in the country. 
 
3 
Therefore, investment ombudspersons are critical in providing insights to policymakers 
to make regulatory adjustments and undertake possible reforms to make the business 
environment more attractive for foreign investors. Countries should consider establishing 
an investment ombudsperson that can coordinate with policymakers at the national and 
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